Significant Opinions for Practitioners

September 2026

1. Ari Law P.C. v. Autonation.com, Inc. (2026) Docket No. A173620 — citation not yet assigned Civil procedure / sanctions safe harbor / notice under Code Civ. Proc. § 1010

   Sanctions safe harbor — notice of motion need not specify a hearing date

   The First District held that the safe harbor notice provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7 do not require the served notice of motion for sanctions to specify an exact hearing date, at least where local court procedure (as in San Mateo County) does not assign a hearing date until the motion is filed. The court expressly disagreed with the Second District's Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank and the more recent J.N. v. Goldberg, both of which had extended strict-compliance requirements to the notice provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 and treated an unspecified hearing date as a fatal defect. So long as the substance of the served and filed motions is the same and the moving party observes the full 21-day safe harbor period measured from service, a later-specified or changed hearing date does not defeat the safe harbor. The court also held that a party who appears and opposes a sanctions motion on the merits — without showing prejudice from the notice defect — waives any objection to defective notice.

   Why it matters: This opens a split with the Second District's Galleria Plus and J.N. v. Goldberg line, so don't assume the rule is settled statewide. In the First District — and any county where hearing dates aren't assigned until the sanctions motion is filed — a served notice of motion for sanctions doesn't need to name an exact hearing date to preserve the safe harbor, but you still need to measure the 21-day period from the date of service and keep the substance of the served and filed motions the same. If you're litigating in the Second District, Galleria Plus and J.N. are still good law there, so the safer practice remains locking down a hearing date wherever local rules allow it. And if you're the party trying to preserve a defective-notice objection, this case is a reminder to do it cleanly: object at the earliest opportunity, be prepared to show actual prejudice, and don't also argue the merits of the sanctions motion at the same hearing — doing both waives the notice objection outright.

   Link pending

2. Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School District (2026) Docket No. S283639 — citation not yet assigned Civil procedure / claim preclusion / jurisdiction — federal-state court relations

   Claim preclusion — effect of the federal two-dismissal rule on a later state court action

   The California Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B) — the 'two-dismissal rule,' under which a second voluntary dismissal of the same claim 'operates as an adjudication on the merits' — is a federal procedural rule governing only the internal effect of dismissals within the federal court system. It does not itself operate as a rule of claim preclusion and does not bar a plaintiff from refiling the same claims in state court, even where the plaintiff twice dismissed materially identical actions (once in state court, once in federal court) before filing the state court action at issue. The Court reversed a split Court of Appeal decision holding the opposite, following the reasoning of Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2001) 531 U.S. 497 that an 'adjudication on the merits' under Rule 41 means only that refiling is barred in the same court, not that the dismissal has claim-preclusive effect elsewhere.

   Why it matters: This resolves a real trap in cases that have moved between state and federal court — common in abuse and civil-rights litigation, where a plaintiff may file in one forum, reassess or fix a pleading problem, and refile in the other. Defense counsel had a colorable argument, adopted by a split Court of Appeal, that a federal two-dismissal automatically forecloses any further state court action on the same claims. After Doe, that argument fails on its own: a federal dismissal under the two-dismissal rule only bars refiling in federal court and has no independent claim-preclusive effect on a later state court suit. If you're defending on preclusion grounds after a federal dismissal, you need an actual claim-preclusion argument under ordinary res judicata principles — the fact that Rule 41(a)(1)(B) labels the dismissal 'an adjudication on the merits' is not, by itself, enough.

   Link pending

3. Gharraee v. Trader Joe's Company (2026) Docket No. F091184 — citation not yet assigned Civil procedure / appealability / timely filing under invalid local e-filing rule — Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6

   Appealability — a notice of appeal rejected under an invalid local e-filing rule is deemed filed as of its original electronic submission date

   The Fifth District held that a superior court's local rule mandating electronic filing in civil cases while categorically excluding notices of appeal and other "appeal-related documents" — via a website-published exceptions list rather than a rule specifying case types or categories — is inconsistent with California Rules of Court, rule 2.253, which authorizes courts to mandate e-filing only by category of civil action, not to mandate e-filing generally and then carve out particular document types. Because the local rule was invalid, the clerk's rejection of a timely, properly formatted notice of appeal under that rule was not a valid basis to treat the notice as unfiled. Under section 1010.6(e)(3) and rule 2.253(b)(6), the notice of appeal was deemed filed on the date it was originally received electronically by the clerk — the last day of the (rule 8.108(b)(2)(A)-extended) appeal period — even though the clerk rejected it and it was not formally accepted into the court's system until nearly a month later. The motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely was denied.

   Why it matters: This matters anywhere a local court's e-filing rule mandates electronic filing broadly but then excludes specific document types — notices of appeal, appeal-related filings, or similar categories — through a website list rather than a rule tied to case categories under rule 2.253(b)(1). If a jurisdictional filing like a notice of appeal is submitted electronically and timely received by the clerk, but rejected under that kind of invalid categorical carve-out, this case supports treating the original electronic receipt as the operative filing date rather than the later date of formal acceptance — so document the submission confirmation (date and time) carefully and preserve it. Don't over-read this as blanket protection for any rejected e-filing, though: the court's holding turns specifically on the local rule being an invalid document-type exclusion rather than a valid case-type-based e-filing mandate, so confirm the defect exists in the relevant court's local rule before relying on this to argue a rejected filing was nonetheless timely.

   Link pending

4. Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions LLC (2026) Docket No. D086542 — citation not yet assigned Civil procedure / renewed motions under Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(b) / appealability

   Renewed motions — a second motion to compel arbitration based on a different contract is still a "renewal" under § 1008(b), and denial of a noncompliant renewed motion is not appealable

   The Fourth District held that a party's second motion to compel arbitration — filed after an identical first motion was denied — was a "renewed" motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(b), even though the second motion relied on a different arbitration agreement in a different contract. The test under section 1008(b) turns on whether the two motions sought the same relief, not on whether they rested on the same factual or legal basis; here, both motions sought the identical order (compelling arbitration of the same wage-and-hour claims and dismissing class claims), so the change in the underlying contract did not take the second motion outside section 1008(b). Because the moving party filed no affidavit showing diligence and new facts, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and — because the denial of a jurisdictionally noncompliant renewed motion is not an appealable order — the court dismissed the appeal outright. The court also rejected the argument that this reading of section 1008 discriminates against arbitration in violation of the FAA, since the renewal rule applies identically regardless of the subject matter of the motion.

   Why it matters: This is a serious trap for anyone bringing a second motion for the same order after a change in the supporting contract, agreement, or legal theory. If your first motion for a given order is denied, any subsequent motion asking for the same order — even one resting on an entirely different contract, statute, or legal theory — is a "renewed motion" under section 1008(b), not a fresh motion, and it must be accompanied by an affidavit showing diligence and explaining what new or different facts, circumstances, or law justify a second attempt. Skipping that affidavit doesn't just risk denial on the merits — it deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to even hear the motion, and a denial on that jurisdictional basis is not independently appealable, so getting this wrong can cost both the motion and any appellate review of it in one stroke. Before filing any second motion for relief a court has already refused, run section 1008(b) as a checklist item regardless of how different the new basis feels — and don't assume arbitration motions get special treatment, since the court expressly held they don't.

   Link pending

5. Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group, Inc. (2026) Docket No. S290188 — citation not yet assigned Civil procedure / appealability / one final judgment rule

   Appealability — voluntary dismissal as an appealable judgment

   The California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action is not an appealable judgment unless the trial court has already reached a final resolution on every claim in the case. Where, as here, the trial court had only sustained a demurrer with leave to amend (before the amendment period expired) and struck certain requested relief — neither of which foreclosed any claim — a voluntary dismissal filed solely to expedite appellate review does not create appellate jurisdiction. The Court disapproved Austin v. Valverde and Flowers v. Prasad, and disapproved language in Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc., to the extent those decisions allowed an appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered after an interlocutory ruling that did not dispose of the entire action.

   Why it matters: This closes off a maneuver some plaintiffs' counsel have used to get fast appellate review of an unfavorable interlocutory ruling: voluntarily dismiss the whole case and appeal from the dismissal itself. After Maniago, that only works if the trial court's ruling actually disposed of every claim in the case — a demurrer sustained with leave to amend, filed while the amendment period is still open, does not qualify, even if the plaintiff has no intention of actually amending. If you're facing a genuinely case-dispositive interlocutory order and want review without waiting for a final judgment, the Court identifies the two real paths: a petition for writ of mandate, or obtaining a judgment specifically on the claims the ruling actually resolved (voluntarily dismissing only the remaining, unadjudicated claims) so there is a true final judgment to appeal from. Austin v. Valverde and Flowers v. Prasad are expressly disapproved on this point — don't cite either for the proposition that a voluntary dismissal filed merely to expedite review is itself an appealable judgment.

   Read the full opinion

6. People v. Esquivias (2026) Docket No. S286371 — citation not yet assigned Criminal procedure / habeas corpus / full resentencing rule — Estrada retroactivity

   Habeas corpus relief — scope of resentencing where a habeas claim seeks discrete, non-constitutional sentencing relief under Estrada

   The California Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus court's grant of partial sentencing relief — here, striking firearm enhancements retroactively available under Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to In re Estrada — does not automatically require the trial court to conduct a full resentencing applying every ameliorative law enacted since the judgment became final. Where the underlying sentence was validly and finally imposed on direct review, and the sole habeas claim raised was a belated, discretionary Estrada claim under Senate Bill 620, the habeas corpus court has broad equitable authority under Penal Code section 1484 to craft relief 'as the justice of the case may require,' including a remedy tailored narrowly to the claim actually pled, rather than being confined to an all-or-nothing choice between full resentencing and no relief. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal and disapproved People v. Duenas to the extent it held that any habeas corpus remedy affecting part of a sentence necessarily requires full resentencing. The majority (Groban, J., joined by Guerrero, C.J., Corrigan, Kruger, and Gooding, JJ.) distinguished Padilla and Lopez on the ground that those cases involved judgments whose finality was genuinely interrupted (an unconstitutional sentence vacated in Padilla; a still-pending direct appeal in Lopez), unlike petitioner's long-final, validly imposed sentence. Justice Evans, joined by Justice Liu, dissented, arguing the full resentencing rule is jurisdictional rather than equitable, that any habeas modification of a sentence renders the judgment nonfinal under Lopez's rejection of 'partial' finality, and that habeas courts lack authority to define the scope of a sentencing court's resentencing jurisdiction.

   Why it matters: This is a procedure/jurisdiction opinion, not a substantive sentencing-law one — it governs how much relief a habeas corpus court must give once it grants any relief at all, which matters any time a client's habeas petition seeks discrete, limited relief (a single enhancement, a single count) rather than attacking the sentence as a whole. After Esquivias, don't assume a favorable habeas ruling automatically reopens the entire sentence to every ameliorative law enacted since finality — the scope of relief tracks the scope of the claim actually pled, and a habeas court can grant narrow, claim-specific relief without triggering the Buycks/Lopez full resentencing rule, at least where the underlying sentence was validly and finally imposed. Practically: if a client wants the benefit of intervening ameliorative laws beyond the specific claim being litigated on habeas, plead them in the petition itself — don't assume a broader theory raised for the first time in a reply, or on appeal from the grant, will get the same treatment, since Esquivias treats an undisclosed 'all ameliorative laws' theory as outside what the habeas court was ever asked to decide. Note the Court is explicit that its holding is confined to this 'rare and idiosyncratic' procedural posture (same judge sitting as both habeas and sentencing court; a claim resting entirely on state-law Estrada retroactivity from a long-final judgment) and disapproves Duenas only on the broad always-full-resentencing proposition — watch how lower courts apply this outside that narrow fact pattern, and watch for legislative action, since the majority itself invites the Legislature to clarify the rule going forward.

   Link pending