Significant Opinions for Practitioners

The Ninth Circuit held it lacked appellate jurisdiction over Meta's (and TikTok's) interlocutory appeals from district court orders partially denying their motions to dismiss on Communications Decency Act § 230 grounds, because such orders are not immediately appealable collateral orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To satisfy the collateral order doctrine, a ruling must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits, and (3) be effectively unreviewable after final judgment — all three Cohen factors are independently required, and the panel held none was met here. Central to the decision was the distinction between immunity from suit (effectively lost if a case erroneously proceeds to trial, satisfying factor three) and immunity that is merely a defense to liability (adequately vindicated on post-judgment appeal). Because § 230 does not expressly confer immunity from suit — its 'no cause of action'/'no liability' language in subsection (e)(3) is better read as intentional belt-and-suspenders preemption drafting than an implied grant of suit immunity, and its subsection (b)/(c)(1) policy language shows only an intent to create a liability defense — the panel held § 230 provides a defense to liability, not immunity from suit, joining the Tenth Circuit's Chumley decision (the only sister-circuit authority on the exact question) and expressly declining to treat its own prior loose use of 'immunity from suit' language in section 230 cases as controlling, since none of those cases actually decided the collateral-order question. The panel also held the ruling failed the first Cohen factor because the district court signaled willingness to revisit § 230 immunity later given the 'novel' theories and 'flux' in the law, and failed the second factor because determining § 230 immunity necessarily requires examining the content and context of the plaintiffs' factual allegations — not something separate from the merits. Appeals and cross-appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Why it matters: Directly controls any interlocutory appeal from a district court's partial denial of a CDA § 230 motion to dismiss in the Ninth Circuit: such an order is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, so counsel defending on § 230 grounds needs a different vehicle — a § 1292(b) certified interlocutory appeal (which the district court can still refuse, as it did here) or waiting for final judgment — rather than assuming an as-of-right appeal exists. More broadly useful any time a client wants to immediately appeal the denial of an 'immunity' defense: courts look past the label 'immunity' to ask whether the statute or constitutional provision actually confers a right not to be tried at all (rare, and typically reserved for government officials or explicit statutory grants like the PREP Act) versus merely a defense to liability that a post-judgment appeal can adequately vindicate. Loose 'immunity from suit' language in prior opinions that never actually addressed appealability isn't binding — don't rely on stray phrasing in cases that assumed jurisdiction without deciding it. And even after clearing the suit-vs-liability distinction, remember all three Cohen factors are independently required: an issue that intertwines with the merits (as § 230's publisher/speaker analysis does, since it requires parsing the complaint's factual allegations) or a ruling the trial court signals it may revisit later will independently defeat collateral-order jurisdiction.

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In a First Amendment challenge to FDA and USDA regulations barring 'FODMAP' nutrient-content claims on food labels, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal — for lack of Article III standing — of the plaintiffs' claims against the FDA and of one plaintiff's claims against the USDA, addressing two distinct standing postures in a single opinion. First, applying Murthy v. Missouri (2024) and the circuit's own Stockton v. Brown, the panel held that a consumer with a FODMAP intolerance adequately pleaded listener standing to challenge the labeling ban: unlike the 'startlingly broad' theory Murthy rejected (a generalized interest in a speaker's work), she identified a specific willing speaker — a food company that wanted to include FODMAP information on its labels but refrained because of the regulations — and had a 'concrete, specific connection' to that speaker as an actual consumer of its products, plus a plausible allegation that other food producers would add FODMAP labeling absent the regulations. Following Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA (2025), the panel held a plaintiff need only show 'a predictable chain of events' from third-party economic incentives, not certainty, and that a speaker's use of an alternate channel (here, its own website) to convey the same information does not defeat listener standing, extending the reasoning of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976). Second, applying the three-part credible-threat-of-prosecution test from Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and Clark v. City of Seattle (2018), the panel held the food company and its owner adequately pleaded pre-enforcement standing against the FDA: they had a concrete plan to continue selling FODMAP-labeled products, the government had communicated a specific warning (USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service told the company, after coordinating with FDA, that FODMAP nutrient-content claims were impermissible), and FDA's general enforcement history against other undefined nutrient-content claims weakly supported the third factor; the government's refusal at oral argument to disavow future FDA enforcement also weighed toward standing. (In a separate, non-precedential memorandum disposition filed the same day — not part of this published opinion — the panel affirmed dismissal of the company's and its owner's claims against the USDA itself for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.)

Why it matters: A useful template for pleading standing in any pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to a labeling, advertising, or disclosure regulation, and a rare published application of listener standing after Murthy sharply narrowed that doctrine. On listener standing: don't plead a generalized 'interest' in receiving information — identify a specific willing speaker with whom the plaintiff has a concrete, personal connection (here, an actual consumer relationship to the products at issue), and note that a speaker's use of an alternate channel to convey the same information does not moot listener standing under this line of cases. On pre-enforcement speaker standing: the credible-threat test doesn't require a warning letter addressed directly to your client — a sister agency's rejection letter relaying that it coordinated with the regulator and both view the claim as impermissible can itself supply the 'specific warning' Clark requires, and a government litigant's refusal at oral argument to disavow future enforcement is affirmative evidence favoring standing, not a neutral fact. Keep the two dispositions straight: the ruling against the company's and its owner's claims against the USDA (as opposed to the FDA) rests on exhaustion, decided in an unpublished, non-precedential memorandum disposition issued the same day — it doesn't qualify or undercut anything held here on standing to sue the FDA.

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The Ninth Circuit held that the State of California and the Giffords Law Center lacked Article III standing to challenge 'Example 4' of ATF's Final Rule interpreting the Gun Control Act's definitions of 'frame' and 'receiver,' because neither plaintiff's evidence established that Example 4 caused their claimed injuries. Where a plaintiff's asserted harm flows only indirectly from the government's under-regulation of third parties, standing requires proof that 'third parties will likely react in predictable ways that in turn will likely injure the plaintiffs' — a causation showing courts must apply with particular rigor, declining to endorse standing theories that require guesswork about how independent actors will behave. California's evidence of increased law-enforcement training and legislative-implementation costs failed because it addressed the ghost-gun problem generally rather than isolating the specific unregulated products covered by Example 4, and because most of the cited expenditures predated the Final Rule; the one post-Rule data point in the record — a declining share of ghost guns among firearms recovered in Los Angeles County — actually cut against California's causation theory. GLC's parallel diversion-of-resources theory failed for the same reasons. The panel also held, in a footnote, that a state cannot establish standing merely by showing a logistical or compliance burden on law enforcement flowing from a federal under-enforcement decision, since that theory would let a state challenge any federal action that allegedly increases crime or imposes indirect enforcement costs. The panel vacated the judgment for plaintiffs and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice for lack of standing, without reaching the merits of the underlying APA challenge.

Why it matters: A useful template for attacking or defending standing whenever a plaintiff's claimed injury depends on how unregulated third parties will respond to an agency's decision not to regulate more broadly: generic, sector-wide evidence of a problem's scope and cost is not enough — the plaintiff must tie the specific challenged carve-out to a predictable, non-speculative increase in its own costs, and evidence predating the challenged rule doesn't count toward causation. This recurring posture shows up across environmental, gun-safety, and consumer-protection APA suits brought by states or advocacy organizations against agency under-regulation; watch for the same causation gap — aggregate statistics about a broader problem, without isolating the specific product, practice, or category the rule declines to cover, will not survive this causation standard. The panel's footnote is also worth flagging on its own: a 'logistical burden on law enforcement' theory of state standing is foreclosed in this circuit, relevant any time a state sues over a federal action it claims will increase enforcement costs or crime rather than directly regulate the state itself.

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On a petition for panel rehearing raising subject-matter jurisdiction for the first time, the Ninth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction despite patent-law counterclaims below. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) is exclusive whenever a party asserted a compulsory patent counterclaim in the action — regardless of whether that counterclaim is itself before the appellate court — so the threshold question is always whether the patent counterclaim was compulsory or merely permissive under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)'s 'transaction or occurrence' test. Applying the Ninth Circuit's two-part 'logical relationship' framework from Mattel v. MGA Entertainment (do the same operative facts underlie both claim and counterclaim, or does the claim's aggregate facts activate an otherwise-dormant right to bring the counterclaim), the panel held the patent-inventorship counterclaims here were permissive, not compulsory — reaching the identical result under the Federal Circuit's own three-factor test in the alternative — so jurisdiction over the appeal was proper in the Ninth Circuit. The panel also held, joining the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits with no contrary authority in any circuit, that a district court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over related state-law claims is broader than the compulsory-counterclaim standard: it reaches claims sharing only a 'common nucleus of operative fact' — a looser 'loose factual connection' — with a permissive federal counterclaim that supplied removal jurisdiction. Petition for panel rehearing denied. Judge Bade concurred in the jurisdictional outcome on different grounds, arguing the majority's reliance on Mattel's 'logical relationship' synthesis substitutes for Rule 13(a)'s actual 'transaction or occurrence' text, and flagged possible tension with the circuit's own Pochiro decision that may warrant en banc resolution.

Why it matters: Essential reading before filing or opposing any appeal in a case involving a patent-law counterclaim: get the compulsory/permissive characterization wrong and the appeal may belong in the wrong circuit entirely, since § 1295(a)(1)'s Federal Circuit exclusive-jurisdiction hook applies whenever a compulsory patent counterclaim was asserted below, even if patent issues aren't what's being appealed. A counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment on patent inventorship or validity is not automatically compulsory just because it arose in the same lawsuit — ask whether the same operative facts prove both the claim and counterclaim, and whether the claim's facts affirmatively activated a previously dormant right to bring the counterclaim; a claim and counterclaim can be logically compatible (both sides can win) and still be separate transactions. On the removal side, this confirms that a permissive federal counterclaim is enough to anchor supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims under § 1367(a) — the 'common nucleus of operative fact' standard is looser than the compulsory-counterclaim test, so removing on the strength of a permissive patent counterclaim doesn't strand the state claims that came along with it. Judge Bade's concurrence previews a live doctrinal fault line — whether Mattel's two-prong gloss should be the operative test at all, versus Rule 13(a)'s bare text — worth flagging if this question recurs, since she suggests the tension with Pochiro may warrant en banc review.

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The California Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B) — the 'two-dismissal rule,' under which a second voluntary dismissal of the same claim 'operates as an adjudication on the merits' — is a federal procedural rule governing only the internal effect of dismissals within the federal court system. It does not itself operate as a rule of claim preclusion and does not bar a plaintiff from refiling the same claims in state court, even where the plaintiff twice dismissed materially identical actions (once in state court, once in federal court) before filing the state court action at issue. The Court reversed a split Court of Appeal decision holding the opposite, following the reasoning of Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2001) 531 U.S. 497 that an 'adjudication on the merits' under Rule 41 means only that refiling is barred in the same court, not that the dismissal has claim-preclusive effect elsewhere.

Why it matters: This resolves a real trap in cases that have moved between state and federal court — common in abuse and civil-rights litigation, where a plaintiff may file in one forum, reassess or fix a pleading problem, and refile in the other. Defense counsel had a colorable argument, adopted by a split Court of Appeal, that a federal two-dismissal automatically forecloses any further state court action on the same claims. After Doe, that argument fails on its own: a federal dismissal under the two-dismissal rule only bars refiling in federal court and has no independent claim-preclusive effect on a later state court suit. If you're defending on preclusion grounds after a federal dismissal, you need an actual claim-preclusion argument under ordinary res judicata principles — the fact that Rule 41(a)(1)(B) labels the dismissal 'an adjudication on the merits' is not, by itself, enough.

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The California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action is not an appealable judgment unless the trial court has already reached a final resolution on every claim in the case. Where, as here, the trial court had only sustained a demurrer with leave to amend (before the amendment period expired) and struck certain requested relief — neither of which foreclosed any claim — a voluntary dismissal filed solely to expedite appellate review does not create appellate jurisdiction. The Court disapproved Austin v. Valverde and Flowers v. Prasad, and disapproved language in Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc., to the extent those decisions allowed an appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered after an interlocutory ruling that did not dispose of the entire action.

Why it matters: This closes off a maneuver some plaintiffs' counsel have used to get fast appellate review of an unfavorable interlocutory ruling: voluntarily dismiss the whole case and appeal from the dismissal itself. After Maniago, that only works if the trial court's ruling actually disposed of every claim in the case — a demurrer sustained with leave to amend, filed while the amendment period is still open, does not qualify, even if the plaintiff has no intention of actually amending. If you're facing a genuinely case-dispositive interlocutory order and want review without waiting for a final judgment, the Court identifies the two real paths: a petition for writ of mandate, or obtaining a judgment specifically on the claims the ruling actually resolved (voluntarily dismissing only the remaining, unadjudicated claims) so there is a true final judgment to appeal from. Austin v. Valverde and Flowers v. Prasad are expressly disapproved on this point — don't cite either for the proposition that a voluntary dismissal filed merely to expedite review is itself an appealable judgment.

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The California Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus court's grant of partial sentencing relief — here, striking firearm enhancements retroactively available under Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to In re Estrada — does not automatically require the trial court to conduct a full resentencing applying every ameliorative law enacted since the judgment became final. Where the underlying sentence was validly and finally imposed on direct review, and the sole habeas claim raised was a belated, discretionary Estrada claim under Senate Bill 620, the habeas corpus court has broad equitable authority under Penal Code section 1484 to craft relief 'as the justice of the case may require,' including a remedy tailored narrowly to the claim actually pled, rather than being confined to an all-or-nothing choice between full resentencing and no relief. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal and disapproved People v. Duenas to the extent it held that any habeas corpus remedy affecting part of a sentence necessarily requires full resentencing. The majority (Groban, J., joined by Guerrero, C.J., Corrigan, Kruger, and Gooding, JJ.) distinguished Padilla and Lopez on the ground that those cases involved judgments whose finality was genuinely interrupted (an unconstitutional sentence vacated in Padilla; a still-pending direct appeal in Lopez), unlike petitioner's long-final, validly imposed sentence. Justice Evans, joined by Justice Liu, dissented, arguing the full resentencing rule is jurisdictional rather than equitable, that any habeas modification of a sentence renders the judgment nonfinal under Lopez's rejection of 'partial' finality, and that habeas courts lack authority to define the scope of a sentencing court's resentencing jurisdiction.

Why it matters: This is a procedure/jurisdiction opinion, not a substantive sentencing-law one — it governs how much relief a habeas corpus court must give once it grants any relief at all, which matters any time a client's habeas petition seeks discrete, limited relief (a single enhancement, a single count) rather than attacking the sentence as a whole. After Esquivias, don't assume a favorable habeas ruling automatically reopens the entire sentence to every ameliorative law enacted since finality — the scope of relief tracks the scope of the claim actually pled, and a habeas court can grant narrow, claim-specific relief without triggering the Buycks/Lopez full resentencing rule, at least where the underlying sentence was validly and finally imposed. Practically: if a client wants the benefit of intervening ameliorative laws beyond the specific claim being litigated on habeas, plead them in the petition itself — don't assume a broader theory raised for the first time in a reply, or on appeal from the grant, will get the same treatment, since Esquivias treats an undisclosed 'all ameliorative laws' theory as outside what the habeas court was ever asked to decide. Note the Court is explicit that its holding is confined to this 'rare and idiosyncratic' procedural posture (same judge sitting as both habeas and sentencing court; a claim resting entirely on state-law Estrada retroactivity from a long-final judgment) and disapproves Duenas only on the broad always-full-resentencing proposition — watch how lower courts apply this outside that narrow fact pattern, and watch for legislative action, since the majority itself invites the Legislature to clarify the rule going forward.

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On independent review of a Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) motion to vacate a guilty plea, the California Supreme Court held that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and focus on the defendant's actual subjective understanding of the plea's immigration consequences — not merely whether the required section 1016.5 advisement was administered and acknowledged on a plea form. A defendant's initials next to a boilerplate immigration advisement, and defense counsel's preprinted certification that the consequences were explained, are relevant evidence but not dispositive, and do not foreclose a showing that the defendant did not meaningfully understand, could not defend against, or did not knowingly accept those consequences. Applying that standard to the record — including the defendant's decades of lawful permanent residency, family ties, and having gone through her sole plea-hearing meeting with counsel through an interpreter — the Court held she established prejudicial error and a reasonable probability she would have rejected the plea had she understood its immigration consequences, reversed, and directed that her convictions be vacated. Justice Corrigan concurred in the totality-of-the-circumstances standard but dissented from resolving the motion outright, and would have remanded for the trial court to identify the specific legal error and make findings applying the clarified standard in the first instance.

Why it matters: A signed and initialed immigration advisement on the plea form is no longer close to sufficient, on its own, to defeat a section 1473.7(a)(1) motion — practitioners on both sides should expect courts to look past the paper record to the defendant's actual, subjective understanding at the time of the plea. For defense counsel bringing these motions, build the record beyond the plea form itself: communications (or their absence) with plea counsel outside the colloquy, language/interpretation circumstances, and personal ties or objective corroborating conduct (here, the client's own decision to travel abroad and return through a port of entry) that are inconsistent with having actually understood mandatory removal was on the table. For prosecutors defending a plea, a generic or preprinted advisement and colloquy answers of 'yes'/'no' may not be enough standing alone if the totality of the circumstances cuts the other way. Note Justice Corrigan's separate opinion flags real ambiguity in what counts as 'error' under the statute — watch for further clarification, since her dissent argues the majority did not identify what the legal error actually was or who committed it.

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The California Supreme Court held, first, that a magistrate's order dismissing a felony complaint is a dismissal in a 'felony case' appealable to the Court of Appeal under Penal Code sections 1235 and 1238, subdivision (a)(8), even though the complaint was never converted into an information or indictment; the Court disapproved People v. Nickerson's contrary reasoning that a felony is not 'charged' for appellate-jurisdiction purposes until an accusatory pleading is filed in superior court. Second, and reversing the Court of Appeal on the merits, the Court held that a defendant has not 'entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison' for purposes of a Penal Code section 1381 speedy-trial demand until actual delivery into the custody of the Director of Corrections under section 2900, subdivision (a) — sentencing alone does not start the 90-day clock. Because the defendant's operative demand was sent from county jail before his transfer to state prison, it was premature, and the Court reversed with directions to reinstate the dismissed felony complaint.

Why it matters: Two takeaways for criminal appellate and trial practice. First, a prosecution appeal from a magistrate's outright dismissal of a felony complaint belongs in the Court of Appeal under sections 1235/1238(a)(8) even pre-information — don't advise a client that such an order is unreviewable or reviewable only by writ under section 871.5. Second, and more consequential day-to-day: a Penal Code section 1381 demand sent by an already-sentenced defendant who is still in county jail awaiting transport does not start the 90-day clock. Defense counsel should calendar and re-send (or advise the client to re-send) the demand only after actual delivery into CDCR custody; sending it early and relying on the original demand date is now affirmatively wrong under this opinion.

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In its first opinion construing Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7's behavior-based peremptory-challenge provisions (subdivision (g)), the California Supreme Court held two things. First, to overcome the statutory presumption that a demeanor- or behavior-based reason for a peremptory strike is invalid, the striking party must do more than have the court confirm the behavior occurred — counsel must also explain why that specific behavior matters to the case being tried; a bare, confirmed observation that a juror was 'less engaged' or 'less attentive' than other jurors, without more, does not satisfy subdivision (g)(2). Second, whether a behavior-based reason overcomes that presumption is not itself dispositive of the ultimate section 231.7(d)(1) inquiry — courts must still weigh any other reasons given and the totality of the circumstances (including the factors listed in subdivision (d)(3)) to decide whether an objectively reasonable person would view race or other protected status as a factor in the strike. Because the Court of Appeal treated a confirmed-but-unexplained attentiveness observation as both curing the presumption and independently dispositive, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings applying both principles under section 231.7's de novo standard of review.

Why it matters: Section 231.7 governs peremptory challenges in every California jury trial (civil and criminal) where selection began on or after January 1, 2022, so this reaches well beyond criminal practice. Attorneys relying on a demeanor- or attentiveness-based strike need to put an explicit, on-the-record explanation of why that behavior bears on the juror's ability to serve in this case — not just get the court to confirm the behavior happened. Trial courts overruling a section 231.7 objection should likewise make express findings addressing both steps (confirmation-plus-explanation, and the totality-of-the-circumstances weighing), since the statute requires de novo appellate review and forbids appellate courts from imputing unstated findings or speculating about reasons not given below. Given the automatic-reversal remedy under subdivision (j) for an erroneously denied objection, getting this two-step analysis right on the record at the trial level is high-stakes for either side defending a strike on appeal.

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The First District held that the safe harbor notice provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7 do not require the served notice of motion for sanctions to specify an exact hearing date, at least where local court procedure (as in San Mateo County) does not assign a hearing date until the motion is filed. The court expressly disagreed with the Second District's Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank and the more recent J.N. v. Goldberg, both of which had extended strict-compliance requirements to the notice provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 and treated an unspecified hearing date as a fatal defect. So long as the substance of the served and filed motions is the same and the moving party observes the full 21-day safe harbor period measured from service, a later-specified or changed hearing date does not defeat the safe harbor. The court also held that a party who appears and opposes a sanctions motion on the merits — without showing prejudice from the notice defect — waives any objection to defective notice.

Why it matters: This opens a split with the Second District's Galleria Plus and J.N. v. Goldberg line, so don't assume the rule is settled statewide. In the First District — and any county where hearing dates aren't assigned until the sanctions motion is filed — a served notice of motion for sanctions doesn't need to name an exact hearing date to preserve the safe harbor, but you still need to measure the 21-day period from the date of service and keep the substance of the served and filed motions the same. If you're litigating in the Second District, Galleria Plus and J.N. are still good law there, so the safer practice remains locking down a hearing date wherever local rules allow it. And if you're the party trying to preserve a defective-notice objection, this case is a reminder to do it cleanly: object at the earliest opportunity, be prepared to show actual prejudice, and don't also argue the merits of the sanctions motion at the same hearing — doing both waives the notice objection outright.

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The Fourth District held that a party's second motion to compel arbitration — filed after an identical first motion was denied — was a "renewed" motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(b), even though the second motion relied on a different arbitration agreement in a different contract. The test under section 1008(b) turns on whether the two motions sought the same relief, not on whether they rested on the same factual or legal basis; here, both motions sought the identical order (compelling arbitration of the same wage-and-hour claims and dismissing class claims), so the change in the underlying contract did not take the second motion outside section 1008(b). Because the moving party filed no affidavit showing diligence and new facts, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and — because the denial of a jurisdictionally noncompliant renewed motion is not an appealable order — the court dismissed the appeal outright. The court also rejected the argument that this reading of section 1008 discriminates against arbitration in violation of the FAA, since the renewal rule applies identically regardless of the subject matter of the motion.

Why it matters: This is a serious trap for anyone bringing a second motion for the same order after a change in the supporting contract, agreement, or legal theory. If your first motion for a given order is denied, any subsequent motion asking for the same order — even one resting on an entirely different contract, statute, or legal theory — is a "renewed motion" under section 1008(b), not a fresh motion, and it must be accompanied by an affidavit showing diligence and explaining what new or different facts, circumstances, or law justify a second attempt. Skipping that affidavit doesn't just risk denial on the merits — it deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to even hear the motion, and a denial on that jurisdictional basis is not independently appealable, so getting this wrong can cost both the motion and any appellate review of it in one stroke. Before filing any second motion for relief a court has already refused, run section 1008(b) as a checklist item regardless of how different the new basis feels — and don't assume arbitration motions get special treatment, since the court expressly held they don't.

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The Fifth District held that a superior court's local rule mandating electronic filing in civil cases while categorically excluding notices of appeal and other "appeal-related documents" — via a website-published exceptions list rather than a rule specifying case types or categories — is inconsistent with California Rules of Court, rule 2.253, which authorizes courts to mandate e-filing only by category of civil action, not to mandate e-filing generally and then carve out particular document types. Because the local rule was invalid, the clerk's rejection of a timely, properly formatted notice of appeal under that rule was not a valid basis to treat the notice as unfiled. Under section 1010.6(e)(3) and rule 2.253(b)(6), the notice of appeal was deemed filed on the date it was originally received electronically by the clerk — the last day of the (rule 8.108(b)(2)(A)-extended) appeal period — even though the clerk rejected it and it was not formally accepted into the court's system until nearly a month later. The motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely was denied.

Why it matters: This matters anywhere a local court's e-filing rule mandates electronic filing broadly but then excludes specific document types — notices of appeal, appeal-related filings, or similar categories — through a website list rather than a rule tied to case categories under rule 2.253(b)(1). If a jurisdictional filing like a notice of appeal is submitted electronically and timely received by the clerk, but rejected under that kind of invalid categorical carve-out, this case supports treating the original electronic receipt as the operative filing date rather than the later date of formal acceptance — so document the submission confirmation (date and time) carefully and preserve it. Don't over-read this as blanket protection for any rejected e-filing, though: the court's holding turns specifically on the local rule being an invalid document-type exclusion rather than a valid case-type-based e-filing mandate, so confirm the defect exists in the relevant court's local rule before relying on this to argue a rejected filing was nonetheless timely.

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